{"id":81084,"date":"2023-07-12T14:30:04","date_gmt":"2023-07-12T04:30:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=81084"},"modified":"2023-07-12T15:52:45","modified_gmt":"2023-07-12T05:52:45","slug":"aukus-advanced-capabilities-pillar-will-require-fundamental-shifts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aukus-advanced-capabilities-pillar-will-require-fundamental-shifts\/","title":{"rendered":"AUKUS advanced capabilities pillar will require fundamental shifts"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States are nearing their third year of the most forward-looking and visionary strategic industrial effort since the 1941\u00a0Lend-Lease Act<\/a>, which empowered the US to lend or lease war supplies to any nation deemed \u2018vital to the defense of the United States\u2019. Their joint decision,\u00a0announced<\/a> in September 2021, to establish the \u2018enhanced trilateral security partnership\u2019 known as AUKUS stemmed from a mutual recognition that China\u2019s military build-up and technological advancement present a clear threat to each country.<\/p>\n

The most high-profile element of the collaboration is to build nuclear-powered submarines (the so-called first pillar of the agreement). But the second pillar of AUKUS<\/a>\u2014cooperation on advanced capabilities including in cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities\u2014is equally important and will require the three governments to interact in new ways with each other, with industry and with other nations. This week\u2019s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, to which the leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand have been invited, would be a perfect opportunity for the AUKUS three to meet and elevate this collaboration to the international stage.<\/p>\n

All three countries have assessed that shifts in the global strategic landscape require them to combine resources and capabilities to maintain a military and technological advantage over revisionist powers that seek to remake the world order both in their own image and to the distinct detriment of others. The AUKUS partnership is needed because, for the first time, the three countries face a competitor, China, that is positioned to establish technological dominance\u2014even over long-held American supremacy\u2014and has the clear intent to use it for malign purposes, whether in high-end military technology or the everyday gadgets we use to communicate with one another.<\/p>\n

That is why the AUKUS nations and their like-minded partners cannot stand by idly as Beijing carries out the\u00a0biggest military build-up since the end of World War II<\/a>, outpacing any other country in the region by a considerable margin. This build-up is aimed at achieving Beijing\u2019s objectives, such as communist rule over Taiwan and operational control over the South and East China Seas, as well as to discourage the US and its allies from confronting China over its increasingly aggressive behaviour.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s technological rise should have come as no surprise: Chinese leaders told the world in the \u2018Made in China 2025\u2019 plan that their strategic objective was to supplant the US as the global leader in advanced technology, and they set themselves on that path through legal and illegal means, including theft of intellectual property and trade secrets and via technology transfer.<\/p>\n

The advanced capabilities element of the AUKUS agreement will be crucial to challenging that trajectory. But meeting that goal will require a series of fundamental shifts in strategy and tactics from the AUKUS partners. The US will need to adjust its export-control policies and laws; Australia and the UK will need to prove they have both the capability and the capacity to pursue such a complex multifaceted endeavour; defence and technology companies in all three nations will need to consider how they can enhance collaboration with one another; and finally, the three partners need to figure out how to expand the security collective to other trusted partners.<\/p>\n

Adapting to new strategic realities<\/strong><\/p>\n

The ability of the three nations to effectively pool their military and technological effort depends on their leaders and the bureaucracies they command making practical changes to the ways business is done. That may mean, for instance, adjusting export rules and ensuring that industrial policy is not stymied by regulation. It also will demand some significant mental and cultural shifts.<\/p>\n

One such shift is to move away from unqualified globalisation and to embrace instead a more strategic globalisation among friends. Free and fair trade is of course generally a good thing, but unfettered globalisation has enabled\u00a0revisionist regimes to exploit economic overdependence<\/a>, including through coercion and by accessing technology from the West that is then used against it. Security and economics, which Western countries treated as separate issues for much of the post\u2013Cold War period, turn out to be inseparable\u2014largely because authoritarian regimes like Chinese leader Xi Jinping\u2019s are weaponising trade and using it to create security vulnerabilities for other countries.<\/p>\n

Freer trade also doesn\u2019t necessarily correlate with increased peace and stability. While there is no doubt that economic engagement can have strategic value, it is increasingly clear that economic relationships alone will not prevent conflict between states. Indeed, trade can become a cudgel if one country exploits its trading relationships to coerce other nations into accepting its illegal and disruptive actions. That is what has happened with Russia\u2019s illegal invasion of Ukraine and China\u2019s creation of militarised artificial islands in contested waters of the South China Sea.<\/p>\n

AUKUS\u2014and in particular Pillar 2 on advanced \u00a0capabilities\u2014is first and foremost a\u00a0technology accelerator<\/a>\u00a0agreement that recognises this reality and provides a practical response. Leaders in Beijing have not only\u00a0made clear their ambition<\/a>\u00a0to remake the global order consistent with their authoritarian values, but also demonstrated appreciation for the fact that technological capability will be decisive in determining who prevails in this strategic competition. The US and its allies are facing a competitor that has become more outwardly aggressive and whose size and strength mean that burden-sharing and collaboration are the only ways to remain competitive individually and collectively.<\/p>\n

As Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has said, the AUKUS partners need to\u00a0\u2018supplement and strengthen\u2019<\/a>\u00a0their respective industries by \u2018pooling resources and combining strengths\u2019\u00a0in order to<\/a>\u00a0\u2018shape our future, reduce our vulnerability to coercion, and help deter conflict\u2019.<\/p>\n

This means governments must work with industry and proactively decide in which areas and with whom they will collaborate. The three governments should set clear standards and prioritise collaboration and investment in universities, research institutions, and defence and technology companies that are focused on advancing open societies that respect human rights and territorial sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Western defence and technology industries, long accustomed to free-market competition without limits, should be encouraged to think more about cooperation with industries in like-minded countries. That doesn\u2019t mean the end of competition, which drives excellence and efficiency. But competition should be balanced against national industrial resilience, especially in critical technologies. This could entail incentives for companies that choose to partner with companies in like-minded countries even if it means bearing some initial higher costs.<\/p>\n

How AUKUS enhances deterrence<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shocked the world into understanding what is necessary during a time of war. But it is also awakening European and Asian leaders to the\u00a0necessity of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific<\/a>\u00a0and to\u00a0what must be done<\/a>\u00a0during a period of strategic competition in which rivals act below the level of conflict, such as employing economic coercion or other grey-zone activities. In a\u00a0joint statement<\/a>\u00a0earlier this year, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted, \u2018What is happening in Europe today could happen in East Asia tomorrow. So, we must remain united and firm.\u2019 In addition to preventing economic vulnerabilities, deterrence requires both the development of military capabilities and the political will to act, if necessary, to help put a ceiling on escalating coercion and prevent contests from becoming conflicts.<\/p>\n

Following through with AUKUS is crucial as it aims to increase capability, credibility and intent\u2014the triumvirate that makes up deterrence. It will demonstrate to Beijing that the US and its allies are prepared to act in unison and break down barriers to sharing the most advanced military technology to maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific. It is the very act of showing a preparedness to defend and win a war that will help avoid it.<\/p>\n

The creation of AUKUS recognises that the world is in the midst of a maritime century, one in which shipping lanes and undersea cables represent the physical and digital lifelines to global prosperity. Maritime stability is essential to international order, and the war in Ukraine has proved just how quickly both can be the targets of revisionist regimes. Whether it is sea cables in the Shetlands or grain ships exiting the Black Sea, disrupting the maritime commons is one way to coerce states. Underwater capabilities like cutting-edge submarines represent a powerful insurance policy to prevent, or mitigate, risks to both.<\/p>\n

Changing ways of operating<\/strong><\/p>\n

AUKUS requires creating long-term partnerships\u2014among governments, industry leaders and civil society. These allies are competing against regimes that have\u00a0long fused their civil and military industries<\/a>. This doesn\u2019t mean the AUKUS collaboration should do the same. It does mean, however, that each of the three nations must consider what whole-of-government or other dramatic changes may be necessary for the project\u2019s success.<\/p>\n

AUKUS has a unique opportunity to use Pillar 2 with clear governance mechanisms to reinvent the security and defence partnership between government and industry. There should be constant engagement between government and industry to foster synergy and innovation and allow the private sector to generate new concepts and ideas for advancing defence capabilities. Since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the AUKUS governments have relied on their respective defence departments engaging with industry to\u00a0identify what missiles, armor, drones<\/a> and other capabilities are available, what gaps exist, and how production and sourcing can address those weaknesses. This type of engagement is necessary to advance Pillar 2 of AUKUS, and it can be done in a way that doesn\u2019t thwart innovation and competition. AUKUS nations can draw lessons from actions taken in similar technology minilateral forums, such as the\u00a0Global Combat Air Programme<\/a>\u00a0spearheaded by the UK, Japan and Italy.<\/p>\n

For the US, unless bureaucratic players are on board to implement such an ambitious initiative,\u00a0the thicket of US export-control policies, regulations and laws<\/a>\u00a0that restrict technology sharing will pose an insurmountable obstacle to getting AUKUS off the ground, especially\u00a0Pillar 2. To date, there has been considerable bipartisan support within Congress. Only this month, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed the \u2018AUKUS Undersea Defense Act<\/a>\u2019, which would authorise changes including the transfer of Virginia-class submarines to Australia, US receipt\u00a0of financial contributions from Australia and the UK for AUKUS-related activities and, importantly, creation of a pathway for exemptions to restrictions on defence- and military-related exports under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. It would be highly unfortunate if bureaucratic inertia or opposition was allowed to hamstring the leader-level AUKUS initiative and the collective deterrence it will deliver.<\/p>\n

Australia has its own major hurdles to overcome in the form of developing the skills and workforce necessary to implement AUKUS. The financial cost of the nuclear-propelled submarines alone for Australia\u2014an investment of between\u00a0$268 billion and $368 billion<\/a> by 2055\u2014will undoubtedly raise questions among the Australian public. But such questions have answers. Politicians must make the case that investment in defence and advanced capabilities now will mean a more secure and stable future and prevent even greater financial and human costs down the road. One has only to look at Russia\u2019s illegal war on Ukraine to see the costs<\/a>\u00a0(in lives and livelihoods) of a conflict that in part is due to inaction and\u00a0underspending by the major European powers<\/a>\u00a0over decades.<\/p>\n

In all three countries, the public and politicians are beginning to focus on the cost-of-living crisis. AUKUS leaders need to be crystal clear that these economic headwinds, including rising food and energy prices, are due in part to Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s war, and that defence underinvestment is not the solution to economic crisis. There will be delays and hurdles along the AUKUS pathway, but transparent and consistent messaging will ensure that they don\u2019t result in fissures to the partnership.<\/p>\n

If workforce issues, regulatory barriers and cost are all bumps in the road, there\u2019s no doubt that the biggest obstacle to both AUKUS and a stable future is a lack of persistent political will. The blessing and burden of democracy is that future governments cannot be bound by previous policies, so the greatest test will be whether these three great democracies have the long-term will to stay the course. From economic downturns and domestic priorities to Beijing\u2019s propaganda that AUKUS is launching an arms race<\/a>, there will be test after test, decade after decade, for AUKUS political leaders.<\/p>\n

Yet, the reality of a future in which the maritime order continues to underwrite the mechanics of global interdependence is unlikely to change. Such an assumption should inform the long-term commitment to AUKUS. The \u2018stabilisation\u2019 of economic relationships with China that all three countries are pursuing, involving political re-engagement and renewed trade, should not be construed as enabling reduced spending on defence and security. It has been the individual and collective strength of the AUKUS partners that has put them in a competitive position with Beijing. This would only be undermined by returning to the failed approach of engagement and trade without due diligence and deterrence.<\/p>\n

Opportunities beyond the AUKUS three<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pillar 2\u00a0is already a crucial component of the AUKUS pact and was always intended to be so. Technology\u2014from artificial intelligence to cyberspace\u2014is now impacting every corner of society, security and national sovereignty. Those countries that remain competitive and continue to have\u00a0control of their technological future will also maintain control of their destiny<\/a>. While the three countries\u2019 respective defence departments now set sail on the decades of work it will take to build the AUKUS-class submarines, rapid development of the advanced capabilities pillar will be required both to remain competitive with Beijing (and to a lesser extent Moscow) and to maintain the social licence to continue investing in defence and security.<\/p>\n

Pillar 2 is a powerful reminder that beyond the sensitive nature of nuclear-powered submarines, developing and deploying advanced technology will be an AUKUS-first but not an AUKUS-only endeavour. It will be essential that the trilateral partnership expands its advanced capabilities work to the Quad and other European and Indo-Pacific partners.<\/p>\n

First, the leaders of the trilateral partnership should demonstrate the importance of AUKUS by cementing its place on the international agenda. When the three leaders or their defence and foreign ministers are together\u2014for example, at G7 meetings at which Australia is invited, or NATO and United Nations gatherings\u2014AUKUS meetings should occur as a natural component, just as the Quad meets regularly on the sidelines of these international meetings. This week\u2019s NATO summit in Vilnius is a good opportunity for AUKUS leaders to consult.<\/p>\n

Second, AUKUS leaders and defence ministers should be clear about their approach to 5G (and 6G) technology. They should issue a joint statement that they are collaborating on 5G to protect their countries and regions from high-risk vendors and make it a call to arms for all like-minded countries. The majority of NATO countries would likely join the effort, which would give confidence to smaller countries that there is a genuine alternative path to Chinese state-owned and state-directed companies for the provision of 5G that is not just secure but affordable.<\/p>\n

Third, whether 5G, quantum computing or space technology (currently not a part of AUKUS), there are ways to show that AUKUS Pillar 2 is inclusive for open societies that share similar values and interests. The\u00a0recent joint statement<\/a>\u00a0by US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi\u2014which committed the two countries to enhancing commercial collaboration in the space sector, addressing export-control issues to facilitate greater technology transfer and establishing a quantum coordination mechanism, among other things\u2014was a game-changing communiqu\u00e9 for supercharging technological cooperation between the two countries. If the US can collaborate with India on these technologies, so too can AUKUS collaborate with other like-minded nations. Doing so would improve trust within those regions that have been sceptical of AUKUS\u2014Southeast Asia and the Pacific, for example\u2014and demonstrate that AUKUS is not just an Anglosphere grouping trying to relive the past.<\/p>\n

Restoring peace through deterrence<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the AUKUS nations work together and explain why they are investing so heavily in the initiative, they might just be able to restore the necessary sense of respect and doubt in the minds of rivals to maintain peace through deterrence and enhance their individual and collective sovereignty.<\/p>\n

After all, Putin thought he could fire a shot and take what he wanted without great cost, while Xi thinks he can have what he wants without firing a shot. Australia, the UK and the US can work together\u2014through AUKUS and beyond\u2014to prove them both wrong.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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