{"id":81469,"date":"2023-08-02T06:00:13","date_gmt":"2023-08-01T20:00:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=81469"},"modified":"2024-01-15T13:40:14","modified_gmt":"2024-01-15T02:40:14","slug":"the-flood-report-and-the-building-of-australias-intelligence-community","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-flood-report-and-the-building-of-australias-intelligence-community\/","title":{"rendered":"The Flood report and the building of Australia\u2019s intelligence community"},"content":{"rendered":"
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As I noted on the recent 20th anniversary<\/a>, the Iraq war, and more particularly the intelligence failure in relation to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, initiated an inquiry the following year, conducted for the Australian government by Philip Flood, a former director-general of the Office of National Assessments (ONA).<\/p>\n

Research from ASPI\u2019s statecraft and intelligence program, released today<\/a>, finds that Flood\u2019s 2004 report was an inflection point between the Australian intelligence community of the past\u2014that is, in the immediate post\u2013Cold War period\u2014and today\u2019s national intelligence community (NIC).<\/p>\n

Flood set the institutional direction for what would become the NIC, most notably the future role for ONA\u2014now the Office of National Intelligence (ONI). His recommendations also expanded resourcing for Australian intelligence, hitherto a niche (or, less politely, marginally relevant) contributor to statecraft, and drew what would become sustained government support for developing sovereign Australian intelligence capabilities.<\/p>\n

Rereading Flood\u2019s report<\/a> in 2023, one is struck by his insightfulness and the enduring relevance of his observations on the business of intelligence. Flood was plain about the need for Australia to be a \u2018global leader\u2019 on intelligence in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, \u2018exceptionally good\u2019 on intelligence in Northeast Asia, and \u2018very good\u2019 on South Asia. He didn\u2019t, however, foresee the degree to which agencies would need to trim their approaches to those core missions to meet imperatives in countering terrorism, combating people smuggling and providing support to military operations.<\/p>\n

At the level of first principles, Flood\u2019s candid description of the functionality of intelligence to Australian governments deserves full quotation, and is equally applicable to the conduct of statecraft today:<\/p>\n

The ways in which intelligence can serve government are wide-ranging and fluid. Some enduring features, however, are clear. Intelligence can, in conjunction with other sources, provide:<\/p>\n

\u2013 warning<\/em>, notably of terrorist plans, but also of potential conflicts, uprisings and coups<\/p>\n

\u2013 understanding of the regional and international environment<\/em>, with which Australian decision-makers will need to grapple<\/p>\n

\u2013 knowledge of the military capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries<\/em>, a vital ingredient in defence procurement and preparedness<\/p>\n

\u2013 support for military operations<\/em>, minimising casualties and improving the environment for operational success<\/p>\n

\u2013 support for an active and ambitious foreign, trade and defence policy<\/em>. Intelligence can provide vital clues about the intentions of others (e.g. military plans) and the ambitions of adversaries (e.g. negotiating positions in political or trade disputes)<\/p>\n

\u2013 and beyond these vital roles of intelligence in providing information, modern intelligence can be a more active tool of government\u2014<\/em>disrupting the plans of adversaries, influencing the policies of key foreign actors and contributing to modern electronic warfare.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Flood laid out an ambitious vision for Australian intelligence. He engaged with the (for some, discomfiting) reality of the need for Australia to have its own robust intelligence capabilities above and beyond the access provided by allies, despite the more typically low profile of intelligence in Australian governments\u2014and a past temptation to lean on those same allies.<\/p>\n

The scope of his review extended beyond \u2018recent intelligence lessons\u2019\u2014Iraq\u2019s WMD, the 2002 Bali bombings and the unrest that led to 2003\u2019s Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands\u2014to the effectiveness of oversight and accountability of the intelligence community (including priority-setting), \u2018division of labour\u2019 between agencies and their communications with each other, maintenance of contestability in intelligence assessments, and adequacy of resourcing (especially for ONA).<\/p>\n

It was in addressing these matters that Flood laid the foundation for the future NIC, upon which would be constructed the reforms instituted by the recommendations of the later L\u2019Estrange\u2013Merchant review<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Importantly, Flood\u2019s recommendations significantly enhanced ONA\u2019s capabilities\u2014not just analytical resources but also the resources (and tasking) needed to address the more effective coordination and evaluation of foreign intelligence across agencies. This was a critical step towards the more structured and institutionalised (if sometimes bureaucratic) NIC of today and an enhanced community leadership role for, ultimately, ONI.<\/p>\n

It was also Flood\u2019s very important innovation to recommend that there be regularised five- to seven-year intelligence reviews, rather than ad hoc responses to public or political disquiet about intelligence agencies (as in 1974, 1983, 1994 and 2004).<\/p>\n

In addition, the Flood report identified issues that remain pertinent and challenging today.<\/p>\n

Notably, Flood argued for more investment in diplomatic reporting (with its positive impact on intelligence for both producers and consumers). He highlighted a 38% decline in diplomatic staff overseas\u2014and thus their reporting\u2014between 1990 and 2003. Turns out it wasn\u2019t just intelligence that was a victim of Australia\u2019s post\u2013Cold War holiday from history. Efforts are ongoing<\/a> to rebuild this diplomatic deficit.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s similar contemporary resonance in Flood\u2019s engagement with the long-vexed issue of the public presentation of intelligence\u2014a matter that had been at the heart of the Iraq WMD intelligence failure. This remains a highly relevant question for governments today, as reflected in the attempts by Western governments to deter last year\u2019s Russian invasion of Ukraine by publicly releasing intelligence indicating knowledge of Russian intentions.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s also continued relevance in Flood\u2019s treatment of cross-community issues, such as:<\/p>\n