{"id":81680,"date":"2023-08-14T12:00:53","date_gmt":"2023-08-14T02:00:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=81680"},"modified":"2023-08-14T11:17:07","modified_gmt":"2023-08-14T01:17:07","slug":"the-future-of-the-rans-surface-combatant-force","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-the-rans-surface-combatant-force\/","title":{"rendered":"The future of the RAN\u2019s surface combatant force"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Defence Minister Richard Marles will soon receive a report from Admiral William Hilarides on the future of the Royal Australian Navy\u2019s surface fleet. The additional analysis<\/a> was initiated by the authors of the defence strategic review. They recommended that the future surface combatant force be split into tiers, with Tier 2 comprising a larger number of smaller vessels than those in Tier 1. \u2018Tiers\u2019 defines nothing; it simply compares one to another in relative terms. Navies don\u2019t fight in tiers; they fight in task groups where the combined capabilities of different ships and systems are integrated into a mutually supporting combat force.<\/p>\n

As Rowan Moffitt<\/a> has noted, Paul Dibb\u2019s 1986 Review of Australia\u2019s defence capabilities<\/em> <\/a>also adopted the tier terminology and our underarmed Anzac-class frigates became our Tier 2 ships. In 1986 terms, the Arafura offshore patrol vessels would have been Tier 3. Moffitt also remarked that our Hobart-class air warfare destroyers<\/a>\u00a0and future Hunter-class frigates<\/a>, which the defence strategic review called Tier 1, would be Tier 2 in comparable regional navies.<\/p>\n

Kim Beazley<\/a> lamented that while he wanted 17 surface combatants in the 1987 defence white paper<\/a>, the peace dividend intervened and he achieved eight. Peace dividends have long been ephemeral. If we had achieved 17 surface combatants in service, history shows that only four or five would have been on task continuously. Now, the RAN has 11 surface combatants.<\/p>\n

We know the as yet unbuilt Hunter frigate program is not in the best of health. There are still important unanswered questions<\/a> about how a rank outsider became the favoured choice even though the Department of Defence received clear warnings about the risk in the RAND study<\/a>\u00a0it contracted. It\u2019s clear that the ship is seriously underarmed and underpowered for its size and therefore poorly suited<\/a> to operations in our region. The Royal Navy, which owns the original design, may well be satisfied, but that\u2019s not sufficient reason for Australia to persevere in constructing a ship already known to have many shortcomings in how we need to operate them.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s no shortage of free advice from those wanting to sell us ships. We\u2019ve seen media commentary on Luerssen\u2019s efforts, and previously Navantia\u2019s. Salespeople help you solve a problem, if you acknowledge and understand what the problem is. Otherwise, you end up where we are now, with a frigate program we don\u2019t really want and a fleet of lightly armed Anzac frigates that will be about 37 years old when they retire. That\u2019s an extraordinary age.<\/p>\n

In our part of the world, combat ships are still essential to attack the enemy while defending themselves and protecting the ships carrying the vast quantities of logistics a fight requires. Where we live, combat operations will be largely at sea whether we like it or not. That\u2019s why all other navies in our region are muscling up, while we\u2019re going the other way.<\/p>\n

Whatever decision the minister makes will axiomatically provide the RAN with operational advantages or disadvantages, and therefore facilitate or constrain government options in future circumstances we must hedge against, but which are entirely unpredictable in time and scale.<\/p>\n

Deciding on Australia going to war, what our strategic objectives are and what a future peace should be are always profound responsibilities held by the government. If Australia\u2019s military lacks flexibility or balance, political options desired by the government may not exist.<\/p>\n

What advice on surface combatants should the minister anticipate from the professionals to help him understand the implications of the choices he must put before government? Here are suggested questions:<\/p>\n