{"id":82785,"date":"2023-10-09T11:30:16","date_gmt":"2023-10-09T00:30:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=82785"},"modified":"2023-10-09T12:03:20","modified_gmt":"2023-10-09T01:03:20","slug":"chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

To compete strategically with the United States and undermine President Joe Biden\u2019s Indo-Pacific policy, China has quietly been advancing its stealthy divide-and-conquer foreign policy agenda on four different but connected frontiers. The core of Beijing\u2019s comprehensive plan can be described as a \u2018blue dragon<\/a>\u2019 strategy, anchored primarily between two \u2018unsinkable aircraft carriers<\/a>\u2019, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. The plan targets three bodies of water in the Indo-Pacific region and the major river systems in Southeast and South Asia originating in the Himalayas.<\/p>\n

Despite Washington\u2019s public denial of a containment policy against China, the US has continued its global spy operations<\/a> and increased its defensive military posture in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration\u2019s recent re-engagement with Beijing emerges from the tense diplomatic hiatus following the Sino-Russian \u2018no limits<\/a>\u2019 pact in February 2022 and the US Air Force\u2019s\u00a0downing<\/a>\u00a0of a suspected Chinese spy balloon in February 2023.<\/p>\n

But can a traditional containment policy prove effective in countering China\u2019s ambitious blue dragon strategy?<\/p>\n

The first frontier in the strategy is related to territorial disputes over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands (as known in Japan). While continuing its operational air and sea activities encircling Taiwan and the cross-strait region, China has been penetrating the East China Sea and beyond into the Western Pacific. The increasingly militaristic China has clearly been demonstrating its show of force to Taiwan, while simultaneously sending a message<\/a>\u00a0to the United States and Japan.<\/p>\n

Armed with two aircraft carriers\u2014the\u00a0Liaoning<\/em>\u00a0and the\u00a0Shandong<\/em>\u2014and a fleet of modern ships and aircraft, China\u2019s unyielding pressure on Taiwan is closely tied to President Xi Jinping\u2019s dedication to the \u2018reunification\u2019 of the \u2018breakaway province\u2019. The Chinese government has explicitly\u00a0stated<\/a>\u00a0that \u2018national reunification is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and occupied again by foreign countries [and] to foil the attempts of external forces [i.e., the US] to contain China.\u2019<\/p>\n

The constant Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force exercises mark an escalation of Beijing\u2019s grey-zone warfare<\/a> in the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands, and even in the vicinity of US military bases in Okinawa and Guam. China\u2019s strategy includes normalising Beijing\u2019s territorial claims.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s second frontier is linked to its militarised artificial islands in the South China Sea. With the release of the \u2018new standard<\/a>\u2019 map of China in August, Beijing has\u00a0claimed<\/a>\u00a0a vast swath of contested waters and reefs, reinforcing its \u2018nine-dash line\u2019 in the South China Sea. China\u2019s neighbouring countries\u2014including India, the Philippines and Vietnam\u2014were\u00a0infuriated<\/a>\u00a0by the new map.<\/p>\n

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal\u00a0ruled<\/a>\u00a0that Beijing had \u2018no legal basis\u2019 for its \u2018expansive claim to sovereignty over the waters\u2019 of the South China Sea. The global community at the time\u00a0hoped<\/a>\u00a0that the landmark ruling would force China to reconsider its claims and honour international law.<\/p>\n

Despite the ruling, however, China\u2019s militarisation of the South China Sea continues, and its escalating assertiveness has compelled the US to try to thwart its expansion efforts. While the US hasn\u2019t ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, it continues in practice to operationalise the convention\u2019s principles,\u00a0maintaining<\/a>\u00a0that \u2018all States [should] enjoy the freedoms of navigation \u2026 [and] lawful uses of the sea\u2019.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s third blue dragon frontier is associated with India, Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean. Beijing continues to claim Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory. These claims are carefully devised to keep India perpetually restless and to drain its military and financial resources rather than finding a permanent solution to the border conflict.<\/p>\n

The northern encirclement of India is also strategically linked to China\u2019s \u2018Buddhist diplomacy<\/a>\u2019 with Sri Lanka and its surrounding Indian Ocean. Beijing\u2019s goal is to transform the Indian Ocean into the \u2018Western Ocean<\/a>\u2019\u2014a name that can be traced back to ancient Chinese literature and poetry. This tale of China\u2019s \u2018peaceful rise<\/a>\u2019 and historical relationships is showcased in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is the \u2018crown jewel<\/a>\u2019 of the Belt and Road Initiative, as evidenced by Beijing\u2019s construction of the Hambantota Port, the Colombo Lotus Tower and other massive infrastructure with loans to the island.<\/p>\n

Sri Lanka continues to play a pivotal role between China, India and the US. When Sri Lanka was declared bankrupt after defaulting on its international loans and other financial obligations in May 2022, it was\u00a0India<\/a>\u00a0that provided the needed loan of US$3.8 billion. Out of concern for disclosing China\u2019s \u2018art of war<\/a>\u2019 in secret dealings, Beijing has advocated a bilateral Sino-Sri Lankan solution and declined to involve a multilateral framework aimed at achieving a sustainable debt-restructuring scheme.<\/p>\n

Instead, China has announced the sending of the\u00a0Shi Yan 6<\/em>\u00a0PLA Navy ship to Sri Lanka later this month,\u00a0raising<\/a>\u00a0\u2019concerns\u2019 in both New Delhi and Washington. In August 2022, India and the US also expressed security concerns over the\u00a0Yuan Wang 5<\/em>\u2019s berthing at the Hambantota Port, which is widely\u00a0considered<\/a>\u00a0the next Chinese military base. US Senator Chris Van Hollen recently\u00a0reiterated<\/a>\u00a0in Colombo that Washington is committed to protecting Sri Lanka\u2019s sovereignty \u2018whether it comes to a free and open Indo-Pacific or debt restructuring\u2019 by providing assistance thro0ugh the International Monetary Fund and supporting the Sri Lanka Navy to safeguard the island\u2019s territorial waters. Thus, the competition over Sri Lanka continues.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s fourth frontier is related to the geopolitics of water<\/a> in the Brahmaputra River basin in India and Bangladesh and the Mekong River in the Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

China has been using the rivers in East, South and Southeast Asia, derived from their tributaries in the Tibetan plateau, to produce hydroelectric power through a vast network of dams. Control over the sources of transboundary rivers, like the Brahmaputra and the Mekong, has also given Beijing significant geopolitical and geoeconomic leverage against the downstream countries. With the expansion of its dam system, China has\u00a0manipulated<\/a>\u00a0the water level of cross-border rivers, disrupting agriculture, farming methods and transportation networks throughout Asia.<\/p>\n

Beijing might keep\u00a0using<\/a>\u00a0the powerful water card of manipulation against downstream countries, forcing them into various compromises and concessions. In other words, China possesses a water blackmail<\/a> tool to pressure lower riparian countries and punish them for policies and actions that don\u2019t correspond with Beijing\u2019s will.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s philosophy to win a war without fighting a battle is illustrated by a range of carefully designed tactics from Taiwan to Sri Lanka. America\u2019s traditional containment methods stemming from the Cold War can\u2019t be used in the context of an increasingly versatile and powerful China. Today\u2019s world is more closely interconnected by political and corporate lobbying as well as technology and trade than it was during the Cold War period. Thus, it is nearly impossible to divide the world into pro-American and pro-China camps, especially when the US-Sino trade regimes are inexplicably intertwined and expanding.<\/p>\n

Washington needs to keep ahead of China\u2019s scientific and technological advancements and maintain US security guarantees to allies and like-minded democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific. However, American military cooperation\u2014in the forms of\u00a0Quad and AUKUS<\/a>, or bilateral defence treaties with the Philippines and Vietnam\u2014is not a\u00a0panacea<\/a>. The US should treat its small allies and friends as partners in both the military and economic realms. The Biden administration has begun<\/a>\u00a0a \u2018charm offensive\u2019 by courting the 18-nation Pacific Islands Forum aimed at curbing Chinese inroads in the South Pacific.<\/p>\n

With its growing centralised power and autocratic mindset, Beijing might miscalculate by overestimating its military might and economic capacities. After all, while America\u2019s Cold War containment policy contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union, the autocratic empire in Moscow collapsed under the weight of its own miscalculations and weaknesses of the centralised system.<\/p>\n

Unlike democratic governing systems that have naturally embedded self-correcting mechanisms\u2014such as regular elections, multi-party platforms and freedom of expression\u2014autocratic and centralised systems tend to erupt from the top, the sides and the bottom like a volcano. In this worldview, perhaps,\u00a0China<\/a>\u00a0might be its own worst enemy. The US would be wise to sustain a highly agile containment policy through active partnerships with friends and allies while allowing Beijing to make its own mistakes and miscalculations.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

To compete strategically with the United States and undermine President Joe Biden\u2019s Indo-Pacific policy, China has quietly been advancing its stealthy divide-and-conquer foreign policy agenda on four different but connected frontiers. The core of Beijing\u2019s …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1826,"featured_media":63442,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[69,56,471,1074,2070,2380],"class_list":["post-82785","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-india","tag-indo-pacific","tag-south-china-sea","tag-sri-lanka","tag-us-foreign-policy","tag-us-china-relations"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"To compete strategically with the United States and undermine President Joe Biden\u2019s Indo-Pacific policy, China has quietly been advancing its stealthy divide-and-conquer foreign policy agenda on four different but connected frontiers. The core of Beijing\u2019s ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2023-10-09T00:30:16+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-10-09T01:03:20+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/GettyImages-630829504.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"624\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Patrick Mendis\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Patrick Mendis\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"7 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/GettyImages-630829504.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/GettyImages-630829504.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":624,\"caption\":\"This aerial photo taken on January 2, 2017 shows a Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning (C), during military drills in the South China Sea. The aircraft carrier is one of the latest steps in the years-long build-up of China's military, as Beijing seeks greater global power to match its economic might and asserts itself more aggressively in its own backyard. \/ AFP \/ STR \/ China OUT (Photo credit should read STR\/AFP via Getty Images)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/\",\"name\":\"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2023-10-09T00:30:16+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-10-09T01:03:20+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/979426057616b7acc2050ef14aac69f0\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/979426057616b7acc2050ef14aac69f0\",\"name\":\"Patrick Mendis\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/16b75ca0d327cebe48397e2266003d1b?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/16b75ca0d327cebe48397e2266003d1b?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Patrick Mendis\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/patrick-mendis\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist","og_description":"To compete strategically with the United States and undermine President Joe Biden\u2019s Indo-Pacific policy, China has quietly been advancing its stealthy divide-and-conquer foreign policy agenda on four different but connected frontiers. The core of Beijing\u2019s ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2023-10-09T00:30:16+00:00","article_modified_time":"2023-10-09T01:03:20+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":624,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/GettyImages-630829504.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Patrick Mendis","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Patrick Mendis","Est. reading time":"7 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/GettyImages-630829504.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/GettyImages-630829504.jpg","width":1024,"height":624,"caption":"This aerial photo taken on January 2, 2017 shows a Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning (C), during military drills in the South China Sea. The aircraft carrier is one of the latest steps in the years-long build-up of China's military, as Beijing seeks greater global power to match its economic might and asserts itself more aggressively in its own backyard. \/ AFP \/ STR \/ China OUT (Photo credit should read STR\/AFP via Getty Images)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/","name":"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2023-10-09T00:30:16+00:00","dateModified":"2023-10-09T01:03:20+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/979426057616b7acc2050ef14aac69f0"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"China\u2019s \u2018blue dragon\u2019 strategy in the Indo-Pacific"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/979426057616b7acc2050ef14aac69f0","name":"Patrick Mendis","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/16b75ca0d327cebe48397e2266003d1b?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/16b75ca0d327cebe48397e2266003d1b?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Patrick Mendis"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/patrick-mendis\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/82785"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1826"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=82785"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/82785\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":82788,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/82785\/revisions\/82788"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/63442"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=82785"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=82785"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=82785"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}