{"id":83288,"date":"2023-11-02T15:00:10","date_gmt":"2023-11-02T04:00:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=83288"},"modified":"2023-11-02T15:30:59","modified_gmt":"2023-11-02T04:30:59","slug":"aukus-raises-questions-that-go-to-the-heart-of-australian-strategic-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aukus-raises-questions-that-go-to-the-heart-of-australian-strategic-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"AUKUS raises questions that go to the heart of Australian strategic policy"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The AUKUS program\u2014sweeping in the intimacy and level of its proposed cooperation\u2014has enjoyed a high level of bipartisan support among the Australian political elite. First agreed by the Coalition government in September 2021, it was reaffirmed by the Australian Labor Party\u2014then in opposition\u2014within 24 hours, subject to a small number of caveats. The Labor government under Anthony Albanese has taken more fulsome ownership of the program since its election in May 2022. The prime minister was in Washington last week, meeting with President Joe Biden and making the case for AUKUS with some recalcitrant members of the US Congress.<\/p>\n

That bipartisanship is unsurprising, given the golden chalice that AUKUS holds out to Australia: namely, assistance in the acquisition of eight nuclear-powered submarines (Pillar 1), a capability exercised by few countries worldwide, and a seat at the top table in exploring the potential of a range of cutting-edge technologies (Pillar 2).<\/p>\n

But it would be wrong to imagine that AUKUS is above political debate. Indeed, quite the opposite. The program has provoked the revival of some old areas of contention in Australian strategic policy and encouraged a few new ones. I intend to explore five: three that relate directly to AUKUS and two others that reflect older, wider divisions.<\/p>\n

The two broader debates are about:<\/p>\n