{"id":83539,"date":"2023-11-13T06:00:01","date_gmt":"2023-11-12T19:00:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=83539"},"modified":"2023-11-14T10:31:03","modified_gmt":"2023-11-13T23:31:03","slug":"how-china-commands-its-peoples-army","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-china-commands-its-peoples-army\/","title":{"rendered":"How China commands its \u2018people\u2019s army\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken\u2019s visit to Beijing in June exposed the scarcity of military-to-military dialogue between China\u2019s People\u2019s Liberation Army and the US military. Stabilising US\u2013China relations to manage competition and avoid conflict was the main goal of Blinken\u2019s visit.<\/p>\n

Despite echoing these aims in its propaganda, Beijing has closed military-to-military channels at the same time that the PLA is ramping up assertive manoeuvres against US assets in the Indo-Pacific, raising the risk of potentially fatal miscalculations and accidents. These channels could mean the difference between peace and war.<\/p>\n

The PLA is the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s military arm. Article 29 of the Chinese constitution states that the armed services \u2018belong to the people\u2019, yet CCP Secretary General and Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated<\/a> to the 20th Party National Congress the importance of \u2018absolute leadership of the party over the people\u2019s army\u2019. As chair of the Central Military Commission, Xi is paramount commander of the PLA\u2014itself a branch of the party, not the Chinese state.<\/p>\n

That might sound similar to the principle of civilian control over the military familiar in the West, including the US president\u2019s role as commander-in-chief, but these parallels are misleading. Xi commands without the checks and balances central to constitutional democracy. The CCP extends its control over the PLA at every level of command through the \u2018military and political dual-command structure\u2019 (\u519b\u653f\u53cc\u9996\u957f\u5236).<\/p>\n

Quoting Mao Zedong at the PLA\u2019s 90th anniversary celebration in 2017, Xi reminded<\/a> the armed forces that \u2018our principle is that the party commands the gun, but the gun is never allowed to command the party\u2019. The CCP uses political organisations to avoid corruption, revolution and dissension in the PLA, and officials have noted<\/a> the importance of the dual-command structure in \u2018fully implementing and embodying the fundamental principle of the absolute leadership of the party over the people\u2019s army\u2019.<\/p>\n

While a dual-command structure will be unfamiliar to most associated with Western-style militaries, it is imperative to understanding China\u2019s \u2018people\u2019s army\u2019. So what is it? And why does the CCP think it is \u00a0the PLA\u2019s \u2018greatest characteristic and advantage\u2019 compared to the West\u2019s single-command structure<\/a> (\u4e00<\/u>\u957f<\/u>\u5236<\/u>)<\/u>?<\/p>\n

Essentially, the PLA reports to the rest of the CCP at every level of command. The party uses a handful of political organisations in the PLA, additional to the military\u2019s command structure, to keep it under control. The political commissar at one of China\u2019s top defence universities has said that these organisations\u2014namely, the party committee system (\u515a\u59d4\u5236), the political commissar system (\u653f\u6cbb\u59d4\u5458\u5236) and the political organ system (\u653f\u6cbb\u673a\u5173\u5236)\u2014represent<\/a> the CCP\u2018s \u2018painstaking exploration and development and gradual finalisation in the process of ideologically building the party and politically building the army\u2019. These are the three foundational political structures at the heart of the dual-command structure.<\/p>\n

The party committee system<\/a> is the \u2018fundamental system of the party\u2019s leadership of the people\u2019s army\u2019. Party committees lead and guide the work of the party at every military level; they also function outside the PLA in all aspects of society. The CCP sees committees as crucial to a \u2018unified system of division of responsibility among heads under the unified collective leadership of the party committee\u2019 (\u515a\u59d4\u7edf\u4e00\u7684\u96c6\u4f53\u9886\u5bfc\u4e0b\u7684\u9996\u957f\u5206\u5de5\u8d1f\u8d23\u5236). While a mouthful, the phrase strikes on the CCP idea of \u2018collective leadership\u2019 (\u96c6\u4f53\u9886\u5bfc) that\u2019s at the core of the dual-command structure securing the rest of the party\u2019s control of the PLA.<\/p>\n

The second pillar of the dual-command structure is the political commissar system. A PLA political commissar<\/a> (\u653f\u6cbb\u59d4\u5458) acts as the \u2018head of his unit along with the military commander at the same level and is jointly responsible for the work of the troops to which he belongs under the leadership of the party committee at the same level\u2019. The commissars lead and organise the political work of units, including education. Since they act at the same level with similar authority as their corresponding military commanders, they are integral to the dual-command structure of the PLA.<\/p>\n

Political commissars also play a role managing discipline, morale and welfare, a function usually filled<\/a> by higher-ranking enlisted soldiers in Western militaries. Political commissars\u2019 specific roles can vary<\/a>\u2014at lower levels they are designated as directors and instructors\u2014but they have similar responsibilities.<\/p>\n

The third pillar, the political organ system, comprises \u2018administrative and functional\u2019 departments that host political work at each level of the military. While little is known about exactly how they function, the role of the political organs is hold the PLA accountable to political objectives through inspection and punishments. (The word \u2018organ\u2019 is the Chinese ji\u2019guan (\u673a\u5173), which can also be translated as \u2018institution\u2019 or \u2018agency\u2019.)<\/p>\n

Using these systems, the dual-command structure provides political command that sits alongside the operational command of military personnel. Since the PLA\u2019s official creation on 1 August 1927, there was only one short period in the late 1930s when it didn\u2019t have a dual-command structure. After an almost immediate increase in disloyalty, Mao quickly reversed the decision and reinstated<\/a> PLA political organisations.<\/p>\n

From the Western perspective, a collective leadership system like this would seem to weaken the PLA\u2019s ability to make good decisions quickly. Its advantage, however, is complete political alignment and, ideally, prevention of corruption. The dual-command structure can secure party loyalty with little room for error, but at some point the party is making a trade-off, be it for speed of communication, innovation or intent. The Western military mind is immediately drawn to the limitations of collective leadership, but without a real test we will never know for sure where those limitations might lie, or how restrictive they might be.<\/p>\n

While understanding the PLA\u2019s dual-command structure is a great start, viewing the PLA as one might view a Western military is the wrong approach. When considering the PLA\u2019s structure, Western leaders must keep in mind what it is\u2014the armed wing of the CCP. It is a civil-war-born military that exists to hold political power<\/a> for the party. The dual-command structure is not just a quirk of command-and-control tactics; it\u2019s integral to the PLA\u2019s purpose.<\/p>\n

In the CCP\u2019s eyes, the PLA\u2019s dual-command structure is just as efficient and powerful as a Western military\u2019s command system, if not better. Above all, if strategists cannot prevent themselves from projecting their Western-style military perspectives onto the PLA, they risk severely misunderstanding the CCP\u2019s lethal arm, and will pay the price for it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken\u2019s visit to Beijing in June exposed the scarcity of military-to-military dialogue between China\u2019s People\u2019s Liberation Army and the US military. Stabilising US\u2013China relations to manage competition and avoid conflict …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1859,"featured_media":83540,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1383,52,2632,1414],"class_list":["post-83539","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-ccp","tag-china","tag-military-civil-fusion","tag-pla"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nHow China commands its \u2018people\u2019s army\u2019 | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-china-commands-its-peoples-army\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"How China commands its \u2018people\u2019s army\u2019 | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"US Secretary of State Antony Blinken\u2019s visit to Beijing in June exposed the scarcity of military-to-military dialogue between China\u2019s People\u2019s Liberation Army and the US military. 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