{"id":84367,"date":"2024-01-09T06:00:05","date_gmt":"2024-01-08T19:00:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=84367"},"modified":"2024-01-08T17:24:31","modified_gmt":"2024-01-08T06:24:31","slug":"defence-acquisition-and-the-paper-trap","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/defence-acquisition-and-the-paper-trap\/","title":{"rendered":"Defence acquisition and the paper trap"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The decision to permanently ground the Australian Defence Force\u2019s fleet of MRH-90 Taipan helicopters was the final chapter in the saga that was Project Air 9000 Phases 2, 4 and 6.<\/p>\n

At the time, both contenders (the MRH-90 and the S-70M version of the Blackhawk) were new and somewhat immature and untried designs without many data points on which to base a long-term ownership decision. But rather than conduct a rigorous \u2018fly off\u2019 to inform a decision, a less than ideal paper comparison was used to select a preferred option.<\/p>\n

The Air 9000 <\/a>acquisition was meant to be the crowning achievement of the 2002 ADF \u2018helicopter strategic master plan<\/a>\u2019, which was intended to achieve efficiencies in sustainment costs by reducing the number of helicopter types in ADF service. That was good policy but poorly executed, it would seem.<\/p>\n

Due to the paper-based appreciation of the two contenders, in 2014 the Australian National Audit Office concluded<\/a>: \u2018Defence was not positioned to readily identify areas in need of developmental work for the respective aircraft, and to confidently inform ministers on the respective strengths and weaknesses of the proposals.\u2019<\/p>\n

After the MRH-90 was chosen for its on-paper performance, Defence started to uncover a range of issues and deficiencies as it tested the aircraft. These included (initially):<\/p>\n