{"id":85115,"date":"2024-02-08T06:00:14","date_gmt":"2024-02-07T19:00:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=85115"},"modified":"2024-02-07T17:24:51","modified_gmt":"2024-02-07T06:24:51","slug":"reducing-risks-cost-and-time-to-acquire-our-aukus-attack-submarines","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/reducing-risks-cost-and-time-to-acquire-our-aukus-attack-submarines\/","title":{"rendered":"Reducing risks, cost and time to acquire our AUKUS attack submarines"},"content":{"rendered":"
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In a recent article for The Strategist<\/em> I painted a depressing picture<\/a> of the UK\u2019s submarine capability\u2014a force undercapitalised, with inadequate facilities, short of personnel and unable to get its nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to sea. Britain\u2019s Royal Navy is struggling to sustain<\/a> a continuous at sea nuclear deterrent, at the expense of its conventional capabilities.\u00a0\u00a0 The combination of issues is leading to poor morale and difficulty filling key senior leadership positions.<\/p>\n

I argued that the RN\u2019s submarine force of four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and six SSNs has fallen below critical mass. Recovery in terms of manpower, shore infrastructure and submarine numbers will not be simple or quick.<\/p>\n

This is a poor foundation for the UK to lead the design of the submarine planned for the UK and Australia\u2019s navies under the AUKUS<\/a> arrangements agreed to by the US, UK and Australia. The risk is compounded by the need to prioritise resources to recover from this situation, sustain the continuous at sea deterrent, all whilst also introducing a new class of ballistic missile submarines.\u00a0 The risk from a delayed, over cost and unproven AUKUS SSN design, requiring prolonged rectification to achieve an operational capability is much higher because of this combination of factors.<\/p>\n

Under the current plan, the capability gap induced by the retirement of Australia\u2019s conventionally-powered Collins Class submarines and the time taken for the transition to the AUKUS SSNs will be covered by the purchase of three to five Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines from the US.\u00a0 This would impact on the US Navy\u2019s force level in a time of shortfall and may well not achieve the necessary agreement from a future US Administration to sell these submarines.<\/p>\n

Further, this would entail the RAN operating two classes of SSN, from two design houses\u2014significantly adding to supply chain, training and support costs. The two countries have different nuclear regulatory regimes which impacts on the design of their respective submarines and poses issues for the current plan. Which standard is Australia to adopt?\u00a0 Presumably that of the USA, given the preponderance of USN support and the intention for the USN to certify our fitness for nuclear stewardship under the current plan. How do we then manage a different standard in a UK designed AUKUS SSN?<\/p>\n

Further, there is a significant risk that neither of the relatively small number in each class will achieve critical mass or an operational capability.<\/p>\n

This is a compounding situation\u2014a change in the plan is needed to avoid it. In developing this we should heed the lessons of the UK situation and ensure that both the UK and Australia\u2019s submarine capabilities individually achieve critical mass. In Australia\u2019s case, I believe this is at least 12 SSNs<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Using the Virginia class as the design baseline for an AUKUS SSN (V), and General Dynamics-Electric Boat (GD-EB) as the lead designer could solve these problems. With a class build of over 38 submarines, currently spread over six blocks, Virginia is a mature design and GD-EB a well-practised designer in updating and building the boats. A secure network and suite of collaborative design applications connecting all three countries would be essential if the program I propose is to succeed. The Integrated Product Development Environment (IPDE)<\/a> used for Virginia has revolutionised shipbuilding, reducing construction times and costs.\u00a0It is also the best way\u00a0to incorporate requirements and design input from the UK and Australia.<\/p>\n

Compared to the option for a UK design lead, which is based on the unsatisfactory experience of the Astute Class<\/a> SSN, which ran considerably over budget and schedule, AUKUS SSN (V) should be less risky, cheaper and importantly, quicker to reach an operational capability.<\/p>\n

I suggest GD-EB be tasked with leading an IPDE team, including BAE Systems and ASC, the UK and Australia\u2019s submarine design houses, to produce an updated Virginia design available for construction in the UK, Australia and the US, optimised for sea denial. The design should be updated to achieve the following priorities:<\/p>\n