Eight of our top ten trade partners<\/a>, and almost 60% of our global trade come from this region, along with almost all of our strategic risk.<\/p>\nThat’s not to say that India doesn’t matter to us; it\u2019s important to Australia in two ways. The first is the bilateral relationship in a broad sense, including things like trade and diplomatic links. But it\u2019s hard to see how that warrants the shift from Asia\u2013Pacific to Indo-Pacific. The second is in the role India plays in Asia\u2014which is already accounted for in the idea of the Asia\u2013Pacific.<\/p>\n
To test this idea, we can try to imagine what action of India\u2019s would both be important to Australia, and would affect neither the Asia\u2013Pacific nor our bilateral relationship. The possible exceptions are the (global) ramifications of some kinds of nuclear events, or a major war with Pakistan. But a potentially global impact isn\u2019t an argument for the inclusion of India into a regional system. And for all this, despite the \u2018Looking East\u2019 policy, India remains essentially strategically inert.<\/p>\n
The other element is the importance of energy and trade flows into Asia. To start with, that seems a thin feature of the international order on which to extend the Asia\u2013Pacific system into the Indian Ocean. And, importantly for Australian strategists, this trade route doesn\u2019t present the kind of operational challenges that Asia does.<\/p>\n
The Indian Ocean is a large and largely empty body of water with an important trade route strung across the top of it. That trade route is protected by the close attention and considerable resources of India, the US (via the 5th fleet), and China for a start\u2014here at least their interests converge. That doesn\u2019t leave a lot of space for meaningful and cost-effective involvement on any serious scale by the RAN.<\/p>\n
Compared to the fraught waters of Asia and the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean does look pacific. There isn\u2019t a sufficient concentration of risks or of contested interests for it to be a useful inclusion into our strategic construct.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, ‘the Indo-Pacific’ amounts to a list of things that matter to us, without much prioritising. But strategy involves paring that list back as far as we can, until we arrive at those features of the international system where we can focus our efforts and scarce resources most effectively in order to secure our interests. And this isn\u2019t just abstract. The smaller our definition of our strategic environment, the fewer objectives we set ourselves. The fewer objectives we set, the more resources we can put into those that really are core interests\u2014and the more chance we have of success. The Asia\u2013Pacific is quite big enough.<\/p>\n
Harry White is an analyst at ASPI.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The term \u2018Indo-Pacific\u2019 is gaining currency. It appeared in this year’s Defence White Paper as an alternative to \u2018Asia\u2013Pacific\u2019, and although the formulation varies slightly, it has been picked up by both sides of Australian …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":71,"featured_media":8547,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[477],"tags":[1425,56,21],"class_list":["post-8545","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-strategy","tag-defence-white-paper-2013","tag-indo-pacific","tag-strategy-2"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Indo-Pacific: listing our interests not making strategy | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n