{"id":9212,"date":"2013-09-12T14:30:14","date_gmt":"2013-09-12T04:30:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=9212"},"modified":"2013-09-13T11:56:32","modified_gmt":"2013-09-13T01:56:32","slug":"asia-essentials-the-us-chameleon-must-adapt-again","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/asia-essentials-the-us-chameleon-must-adapt-again\/","title":{"rendered":"Asia Essentials: the US chameleon must adapt again"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n The security system the US has evolved in Asia has dealt with upsets, defeats, setbacks and even the dangers of victory. The US suffered a bitter draw in Korea that\u2019s had a half-life equal to the San Francisco treaty system, and has experienced defeat in Vietnam, the loss of the Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines and the loss of the Soviet Union as the obvious enemy\u2014a cruel thing to have happen to an alliance system. Through it all, the US system endures. The creation of the new superbase on Guam<\/a> is a major statement of 21st century intent. The pivot that turned into a rebalance notches up the volume of the statement.<\/p>\n Compared to the multilateral depth and unified command of NATO, the US alliances in Asia can change shape, form and colour from country to country. The previous column saw these alliances in three layers<\/a>: formal treaty alliances on top, de facto or virtual alliances in the middle and the bottom layer consisting of quasi or partial alliances that could more politely be called relationships or partnerships. The various Asian customers have a choice of size, function, tempo and commitment in what they ask of the US military chameleon.<\/p>\n At the high tempo end\u2014in South Korea and Japan\u2014the US makes huge investments of people, hardware and coordination of command. At the low tempo end, the commitments can be looser, even in treaty alliances such as with the Philippines and Thailand. As the Philippines starts asking for more, the tempo and investment have risen.<\/p>\n The same effect can be seen in the lowest layer in the quasi or partial alliances such as the long-established version with Malaysia and the new relationship being created with Vietnam. The partial alliances (read: partnerships) offer little permanent structure or joint military planning, and certainly no integrated command. It\u2019s at this low end\u2014with a country like Malaysia, for instance\u2014that the US military chameleon has been quietly creative, learning to live with silences and implicit deals. It was the secret military pact Malaysia signed with the US in 1984<\/a>\u2014three years after Mahathir Mohamad came to power\u2014that eventually give birth to the US doctrine in Asia of \u2018places not bases\u2019.<\/p>\n The adaptable quality of the US alliance system is an important attribute which informs the construction of a new multilateral system for Asia. If even the existing alliance system is fuzzy in its operation, expect the creation and operation of a new concert to be even more fluid.<\/p>\n The US alliance system lives because everyone in Asia, except China, wants to see the US military\u2019s guarantee to the region continue. Not so long ago, even China could see the sense in the US continuing to keep Japan in its box. Unfortunately, that bargain between Mao and Nixon has expired.<\/p>\n